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Key findings  
 
To permit the use of unproven algorithms in the police service in a controlled and time-limited 
way, and as part of a combination of approaches to combat algorithmic opacity, our research 
proposes ‘ALGO-CARE’, a guidance framework of some of the key legal and practical 
concerns that should be considered in relation to the use of algorithmic risk assessment tools 
by the police. As is common across the public sector, the UK police service is under pressure 
to do more with less, and to target resources more efficiently and take steps to identify threats 
proactively; for example under risk-assessment schemes such as ‘Clare’s Law’ and ‘Sarah’s 
Law’. Algorithmic tools promise to improve a police force’s decision-making and prediction 
abilities by making better use of data (including intelligence), both from inside and outside the 
force. This research uses Durham Constabulary’s Harm Assessment Risk Tool (HART) as a 
case-study. HART is one of the first algorithmic models to be deployed by a UK police force in 
an operational capacity. Our research comments upon the potential benefits of such tools, 
explains the concept and method of HART and considers the results of the first validation of 
the model’s use and accuracy. The research concludes that for the use of algorithmic tools in 
a policing context to result in a ‘better’ outcome, that is to say, a more efficient use of police 
resources in a landscape of more consistent, evidence-based decision-making, then an 
‘experimental’ proportionality approach should be developed to ensure that new solutions 
from ‘big data’ can be found for criminal justice problems traditionally arising from clouded, 
non-augmented decision-making. Finally, our research notes that there is a sub-set of 
decisions around which there is too great an impact upon society and upon the welfare of 
individuals for them to be influenced by an emerging technology; to an extent, in fact, that 
they should be removed from the influence of algorithmic decision-making altogether. 
 
Executive summary 
Algorithmic risk assessment policing models: Lessons 
from the Durham Constabulary HART model 
Background: Durham Constabulary and the HART model 
The ‘Harm Assessment Risk Tool’ (or ‘HART’) was developed by statistical experts based at 
the University of Cambridge in collaboration with Durham Constabulary.  It has been 
developed to aid decision-making by custody officers when assessing the risk of future 
offending and to enable those suspects forecast as moderate risk to be eligible for the 
Constabulary’s Checkpoint programme.  Checkpoint is an intervention currently being tested 
in the Constabulary and is an ‘out of court disposal’ (a way of dealing with an offence not 
requiring prosecution in court) aimed at reducing future offending. For schemes where difficult 
risk-based judgements are required, it has been argued that a fair and trustworthy algorithmic 
decision-making tool may potentially be helpful, provided not used in a determinative way. All 
algorithmic responses use the past, where the outcomes have already taken place, as a 
model of what will take place in the future.  The HART model is built using approximately 
104,000 custody events over a five year period (2008-2012).  It uses 34 different predictors to 
arrive at a forecast, most of which focus upon the prior offender’s history of criminal 
behaviour. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Context and Findings 
The data used as predictors in HART will, for the time being, remain limited to those held 
within Durham Constabulary systems.  The system will not utilise data from other local 
agencies in Durham, other police force areas, or national IT systems such as the Police 
National Computer or the Police National Database.  This limitation is just one reason that 
such models can serve only to inform human decision making, and will remain unable to 
function as the ultimate decision maker at any stage of the criminal justice system.  The 
model simply does not have all of the information available to it, and can therefore only 
support human decision-makers, rather than replace them.  The custody officers will long 
retain their discretion and the model will not fetter the options available to them.  With both 
their own local knowledge and their access to other data systems, custody officers will 
frequently be aware of other information that overrides the model’s predictions, and they must 
apply their own judgement in deciding upon the disposition of each offender’s case. 
An independent validation study was conducted of HART during 2016, with data not used to 
build the model.  Custody data for the full year of 2013 were used for the validation, using just 
under 15,000 custody events.  The model’s forecasts for each custody event during 2013 
were then compared to the actual, known outcomes over the following 24 months.  The 2013 
validated accuracy overall of the model was 62.8%, which reflects a modest drop from 
construction estimate of 68.5%.  The largest loss of accuracy in validation occurred amongst 
those that had actual high risk outcomes, where the accuracy rates fell from 72.6% to 52.7%. 
In Durham Constabulary, the initial version of HART has required the custody officers to make 
their own predictions of each offender’s future arrests whenever the algorithm has been used.  
These data will eventually allow a direct comparison of the police officer’s human judgement 
to the HART forecasts.  Early results show that custody officers are generally uneasy with 
forecasting at either extreme, and avoid making both high and low risk predictions.  A 
substantial majority of officer predictions are for moderate risk behaviour (61.4%), and the 
model and officers agree only 55.5% of the time.  There is a clear difference of opinion 
between human and algorithmic forecasts.  Nevertheless, caution should be taken to not hold 
algorithms to an idealistic standard of accuracy that does not exist in reality. 
The HART model contains over 4.2 million decision points, all of which are highly 
interdependent on the ones that precede them within the tree structure.  These details could 
be made freely available to the public, but would require a huge amount of time and effort to 
fully understand.  It is becoming increasingly difficult to explain to non-computer scientists and 
non-statisticians how a machine learning forecasting model arrives at its outcomes, and the 
potential for misunderstanding and even intentional misrepresentation is vast. Our argument 
is that a model must be developed (as provided overleaf, below) which ensure accountability 
and best-practice from the off. 
Implicit in the points made in the ‘Lawful’ section of ‘Algo-Care’ below is whether a statistical, 
algorithmic method is appropriate at all in each given situation, and whether it can ever be 
justified to use certain categories of data, for instance ethic origin, as ‘inputs’.  We would 
advocate that, as part of a programme of legal regulation or police adoption of algorithmic 
intelligence analysis models, clarity is needed as to categories of decision – such as those 
that may impact Article 2 ECHR (right to life) or the fundamentals of a fair trial – that would 
not benefit from ‘experimental’ modelling or presumptions of proportionality and indeed which 
should be excluded from the purview of algorithmic tools altogether. 
 An accountability model for algorithmic intelligence 
Algorithms in Policing – Take ALGO-CARE™ 
A proposed decision-making framework for the deployment of algorithmic assessment tools 
in the policing context 
A Advisory Is the assessment made by the algorithm used in an advisory 
capacity?  Does a human officer retain decision-making discretion? 
What other decision-making by human officers will add objectivity to the 
decisions (partly) based on the algorithm? 
L Lawful On a case-by-case basis, what is the policing purpose justifying the use 
of algorithm, both its means and ends?1 Is the potential interference 
with the privacy of individuals necessary and proportionate for 
legitimate policing purposes?  In what way will the tool improve the 
current system and is this demonstrable? Are the data processed by 
the algorithm lawfully obtained, processed and retained, according to a 
genuine necessity with a rational connection to a policing aim?  Is the 
operation of the tool compliant with national guidance? 
G Granularity Does the algorithm make suggestions at a sufficient level of 
detail/granularity, given the purpose of the algorithm and the nature of 
the data processed?  Is data categorised to avoid ‘broad-brush’ 
grouping and results, and therefore issues potential bias?  Do the 
benefits outweigh any technological or data quality uncertainties or 
gaps?  Is the provenance and quality of the data sufficiently 
sound?  Consider how often the data should be refreshed. If the tool 
takes a precautionary approach towards false negatives, consider the 
justifications for this. 
O Ownership Who owns the algorithm and the data analysed?  Does the force need 
rights to access, use and amend the source code and data 
analysed?  How will the tool be maintained and updated? Are there any 
contractual or other restrictions which might limit accountability or 
evaluation?  How is the operation of the algorithm kept secure? 
C Challengeable What are the post-implementation oversight and audit mechanisms e.g. 
to identify any bias? Where an algorithmic tool informs criminal justice 
disposals, how are individuals notified of its use (as appropriate in the 
context of the tool’s operation and purpose)? 
A Accuracy Does the specification match the policing aim and decision policy? Can 
the stated accuracy of the algorithm be validated reasonably 
periodically?  Can the percentage of false positives/negatives be 
justified? How was this method chosen as opposed to other available 
methods?  What are the consequences of inaccurate forecasts?  Does 
this represent an acceptable risk (in terms of both likelihood and 
impact)?  Is the algorithmic tool deployed by those with appropriate 
expertise? 
R Responsible Would the operation of the algorithm be considered fair?  Is the use of 
the algorithm transparent (taking account of the context of its use), 
accountable and placed under review alongside other IT developments 
in policing? 
Would it be considered to be for the public interest and ethical? 
E Explainable Is appropriate information available about the decision-making rule(s) 
and the impact that each factor has on the final score or outcome (in a 
similar way to a gravity matrix)? Is the force able to access and deploy 
a data science expert to explain and justify the algorithmic tool (in a 
similar way to an expert forensic pathologist)? 
 
Conclusion 
